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Abstract: We evaluate the potential for using border carbon adjustments (BCAs) and welfare-maximizing 
tariffs to compel non-compliant countries to meet emissions reduction targets pledged under the Paris 
Climate Agreement. Our analysis employs a numerical economy-wide model with energy sector detail and, 
given recent actions by the new US administration, considers BCAs on US exports. We find that BCAs 
result in small reductions in US emissions and welfare. Consequently, the US is better off when it does 
not restrict emissions and faces BCAs on its exports than when it implements policies consistent with the 
Paris Agreement. However, targeted welfare-maximizing tariffs could inflict greater cost on the US than if 
it complied with its pledged emissions reductions. We conclude that BCAs are an ineffective enforcement 
mechanism but carefully chosen tariffs could be a mechanism to enforce the Paris Agreement.
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1. Introduction
At the 2015 Paris Climate Conference—the 21st Confer-
ence of the Parties (COP21) under the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC)—
representatives from 195 countries set out an agreement 
to mitigate greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. The frame-
work required countries representing at least 55% of 
global GHG emissions to sign up to the agreement for it 
to take force. This occurred in October 2016 and the Par-
is Agreement was formally ratified on November 4, 2016. 
Nations that are parties to the agreement are required to 
submit National Determined Contributions (NDCs) that 
outline future reductions in GHG emissions out to 2030. 
The US, under the Obama Administration, submitted its 
NDC on September 3, 2016. This document stated that 
the US would reduce economy-wide GHG emissions by 
26–28 percent below its 2005 level by 2025. However, this 
pledge, like all NDCs, is not binding under international 
law and a nation can back out of the deal with four years 
notice by withdrawing from the agreement (Stutter, 2017) 
or in one year by leaving the UNFCC (Mathiesen, 2016).
Following the 2016 US presidential election, the future 
involvement of the US in the global accord is uncertain. 
Although the carbon pricing scheme recently proposed 
by an eminent group of Republicans (Baker et al., 2017) 
and Secretary of State Ross Tillerson’s statement that 
the US should remain a party to the Paris Agreement 
(DiChristopher, 2017) indicate that the US may meet its 
NDC goal, other signs from the Trump Administration 
paint a different picture. In the lead up to the 2016 elec-
tion, Donald Trump vowed to remove the US from the 
Paris Agreement (Stutter, 2017) and in 2012 Trump post-
ed on Twitter, ‘The concept of global warming was creat-
ed by and for the Chinese in order to make US manufac-
turing non-competitive’ (Wong, 2016). Trump’s actions 
since taking office have been consistent with his pre-elec-
tion view on climate change. Significantly, Trump signed 
an executive order on March 28, 2017 that initiated a 
review of the Clean Power Plan—an Obama administra-
tion policy that aims to reduce carbon dioxide emission 
from electricity generation—and rescinded the morato-
rium on coal mining on US federal lands (Merica, 2017). 
Other senior Republicans are also dismissive about climate 
change. For example, Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) Chief Scott Pruitt stated that carbon dioxide (CO2) 
is not a primary contributor to global warming and that 
the Paris Agreement is a ‘bad deal’ (DiChristopher, 2017). 
Additionally, House of Representatives Speaker Paul Ryan 
has stated that ‘the Paris climate deal would be disastrous 
for the American economy’ (Doyle and Rampton, 2016). 
The 2016 presidential election has also resulted in a change 
in US trade policy, from actively seeking trade liberaliza-
tion to a more protectionist stance. Notably, shortly after 
his inauguration, President Trump withdrew the US from 
negotiations for the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement. 
The White House also plans to renegotiate the North 
American Free Trade Agreement and the President has 
stated that the US will terminate the agreement if a ‘fair’ 
deal is not reached (Liptak and Merica, 2017). On April 
24, 2017 he announced plans to impose tariffs of up 24% 
on Canadian lumber entering the US (Gillespie, 2017). 
In this paper, we evaluate the role of border carbon ad-
justments (BCAs) and welfare-maximizing tariffs as a 
mechanism to persuade a non-compliant country to re-
duce GHG emissions. BCAs—tariffs on embodied car-
bon emissions imposed by countries with climate poli-
cies on imports from countries without them—have been 
proposed in policy circles. For example, the directive for 
the EU Emissions Trading System includes provisions for 
BCAs, and the American Clean Energy and Security Act 
of 2009 (US Congress, 2009), which was passed by the 
House of Representatives but died in the Senate, includ-
ed import requirements analogous to a tariff on embod-
ied carbon emissions (Winchester et al., 2011).
Most previous studies of BCAs have focused on the im-
pact of BCAs on emissions and consider tariffs imposed 
by a group of developed countries on imports from other 
nations (e.g., Felder and Rutherford 1993; Demailly and 
Quirion 2008; Ponssard and Walker 2008; Mattoo et al. 
2009; Burniauxet et al. 2010; Winchester et al., 2011; Win-
chester, 2012; and Sakai and Barrett, 2016). Babiker and 
Rutherford (2005) consider a menu of border measures 
(e.g., border carbon adjustments and rebates on exports) 
imposed by countries parties to the Kyoto agreement on 
imports from other countries and derive the Nash equi-
librium over trade instruments. In reviewing the BCA 
literature, Böhringer et al. (2012) note that carbon tariffs 
shift some cost of reducing emissions from regions that 
restrict emissions to those that do not. We build on this 
literature by evaluating the role of BCAs and other trade 
measures as an enforcement mechanism to persuade a 
non-compliant country to reduce GHG emissions.
Motivated by recent actions by the US that would make it 
appear unlikely it would live up to its Paris commitment, 
our analysis considers a case where all regions except the 
US implement polices to reduce emissions and US exports 
face BCAs. Using a global multi-sectoral, multi-region 
economy-wide model with energy sector detail, we quan-
tify outcomes under this case and compare them to a case 
where all regions meet their Paris pledges. We also com-
pare the impact of BCAs to the Nash equilibrium of a ‘tariff 
war’ where countries impose welfare maximizing tariffs.1 
1  Our quantification of tariff outcomes does not consider the legal 
aspects of these measures under international treaties. See Kemp (2016) 
for a discussion of these issues.
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This paper has three further sections. Section 2 describes 
the structure and data sources for our economy-wide 
model and the scenarios implemented in our analysis. 
Our results are presented and discussed in Section 3. 
Section 4 concludes.
2. Methods
2.1 Modeling Framework
Our analysis employs an economy-model with a detailed 
representation of energy production that builds on the 
‘GTAP-Energy in GAMS’ model (Rutherford and Palt-
sev, 2000). The model is a static, multi-sector, multi-re-
gion applied general equilibrium model of the global 
economy that links economic activity to energy produc-
tion and CO2 emissions from the combustion of fossil 
fuels. Regions in the model are interconnected via bilat-
eral international trade flows and sectors are linked by 
purchases of intermediate inputs.
In each region and sector, there is a representative firm 
that produces output by hiring primary factors and pur-
chasing intermediate inputs from other firms. There is 
also a representative agent in each region that derives 
income from selling factor services and an exogenous 
net international transfer that reflects the current ac-
count balance. A government sector is not explicitly 
modelled, but taxes and subsidies on transactions are 
represented, and government purchases are included in 
household consumption in each region. Net fiscal deficits 
and, where applicable, revenue from the sale of emission 
permits are passed to consumers as (implicit) lump sum 
transfers. Although the model is static, investment is in-
cluded as a proxy for future consumption and is a fixed 
proportion of expenditure by each regional household.
Sectors, regions and primary factors included in the 
model are listed in Table 1. The model represents three 
sectors related to the extraction of fossil fuels (Coal, 
Crude oil, Natural gas) and two sectors that process these 
fuels into secondary energy (Refined oil and Electricity). 
Fossil fuels are also used directly by other sectors and re-
gional households. The representation of manufacturing 
includes four sectors that use energy intensively (Chem-
ical, rubber & plastic products; Non-metallic minerals; 
Iron and steel; and Non-ferrous metals) and seven oth-
er manufacturing sectors (Food processing; Fabricated 
metal products, Textiles, clothing & footwear; Transpor-
tation equipment; Electronic equipment; Other machin-
ery and equipment; and Other manufacturing). Agricul-
tural activities and services are each included in separate 
aggregated sectors.
The model represents the US and seven regions that ac-
count for a high share of US exports or/and have set out 
ambitious plans to reduce GHG emissions. Most of these 
regions are individual countries (e.g., Canada, Mexico, and 
China), but some regions include an aggregation of na-
Table 1. Model aggregation.
Sectors Regions
agr Agriculture usa USA
Cru Crude oil anz Australia & New Zealand
Oil Refined oil products can Canada
Col Coal chn China
Gas Natural gas jpn Japan
ele Electricity eur European Union & EFTA
crp Chemical, rubber & plastic products mex Mexico
nmm Non-metallic minerals kor South Korea
is Iron and Steel row Rest of World
Nfm Non-ferrous metals
Fmp Fabricated metals products Primary factors
Fod Food processing cap Capital
Tcf Textiles, clothing & footwear lab Labor
Trn Transportation equipment rcr Crude oil resources
Eeq Electronic equipment rco Coal resources
Ome Other machinery & equipment rga Natural gas resources
Omf Other manufacturing
Ser Services
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tions (Australia & New Zealand and the European Union 
& European Free Trade Area, EFTA). Remaining countries 
are included in a composite ‘Rest of World’ region. Brazil, 
Russia and India are not represented as separate regions 
as several studies estimate that 2030 emissions consistent 
with NDC pledges are close to or above BAU emissions—
see, for example, Fawcett et al. (2015), Aldy et al. (2016), 
Vandyck et al. (2016) and Jacoby et al. (2017). Primary 
factors in the model include capital, labor, and primary 
resources for the extraction of each fossil fuel.
For computational reasons, we also simulate some scenarios 
using a more aggregated version of the model (see Section 
2.2). This aggregation represents two regions, seven sec-
tors, and the primary factors listed in Table 1. The regional 
aggregation representing the US and all other countries are 
included in a composite region that we label the ‘Coalition’. 
Sectors in the more-aggregate version of the model include 
the five energy sectors in Table 1 (Coal, Crude oil, Natural 
gas, Refined oil, and Electricity), services, and ‘Other in-
dustry’, a composite of the remaining sectors. 
Production in each sector is represented by a multi-level 
nest of constant elasticity of substitution (CES) functions. 
Production structures are outlined in panels (a), (b) and 
(c) of Figure 1. Fossil fuel commodities are produced by 
a CES aggregate of a sector-specific resource and a com-
posite of capital, labor and intermediate inputs. Other sec-
tors combine intermediate inputs, capital and labor. Final 
consumption in each region is also represented by nested 
a CES function, as outlined in panel (d). Use of Coal, Re-
fined oil, or Natural gas, either as intermediate inputs or in 
final consumption, result in the release of CO2 emissions 
in fixed proportions with the use of each fuel.
Features of the model that have a large influence on the 
cost of abating emissions include: (1) substitution among 
different forms of energy in production and final con-
sumption, (2) substitution between aggregate energy and 
capital-labor in production, and (3) substitution between 
aggregate energy and other goods in final consumption. 
The production structure and elasticity values that, in 
tandem with input cost shares, govern these substitution 
possibilities are detailed in the notes to Figure 1 and are 
guided by those used in the MIT Economic Projection 
and Policy Analysis (EPPA) model (Paltsev et al., 2005; 
Chen et al., 2016). To account for the increased pene-
tration of low-carbon generation sources under a carbon 
price, we set the elasticity of substitution between energy 
and capital-labor in electricity generation equal to 0.85, 
compared to 0.6 in Paltsev et al. (2005). This higher elas-
ticity of substitution increases the scope for producing 
electricity with less fuel and more capital in response to 
rising fuel costs. Implied marginal abatement cost curves 
in the model are increasing convex functions of the 
quantity of emissions abated. 
International trade in goods and services follows the 
‘Armington approach’ that assumes that goods are differ-
entiated by country of origin (Armington, 1969). Specif-
ically, for each region and commodity, imports are com-
bined using a CES function that aggregates goods from 
different regions, and aggregate imports are and domestic 
production are combined using a further CES function. 
Figure 1. Production and consumption nesting structures.
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This two-level CES next produces an ‘Armington’ supply 
for each commodity, which is purchased by firms and 
households and is a composite of domestic and import-
ed varieties. Values for elasticities of substitution in the 
trade specification are sourced from Hertel et al. (2007). 
Turning to closure, factor prices are endogenous and there 
is full employment; factors are immobile internationally, 
but capital and labor are mobile across sectors; and each re-
gion maintains a constant current account surplus/deficit. 
The model is calibrated using version 9 of the Global Trade 
Analysis Project (GTAP) database (Aguiar et al., 2016) and 
the GTAP-Power database (Peters, 2016). These databases 
include economic data and CO2 emissions from the com-
bustion of fossil fuels for 140 regions and 68 sectors, which 
we aggregate to the elements in Table 1 using tools provid-
ed by Lanz and Rutherford (2016). The database provides 
a snapshot of the global economy in 2011.
The model is formulated and solved as a mixed comple-
mentarity problem using the Mathematical Program-
ming Subsystem for General Equilibrium (MPSGE) 
described by Rutherford (1995) and the Generalized Al-
gebraic Modeling System (GAMS) mathematical mod-
eling language (Rosenthal, 2012) with the PATH solver 
(Dirkse and Ferris, 1995).
2.2 Scenarios
To focus the analysis on the period when NDCs will have 
the largest impact, our scenarios estimate outcomes in 
2030. As the model is calibrated to 2011 data, we imple-
ment a forward calibration simulation to generate a 2030 
‘business as usual’ (BAU) case. Our BAU projection sim-
ulates autonomous energy efficiency improvements and 
endogenous increases in total factor productivity to tar-
get estimates of GDP in each region in 2030. We impose 
autonomous energy efficiency improvements of 1% per 
year in fossil fuel use, and a 0.03% annual efficient im-
provement in electricity use. We source estimates of 2030 
GDP from the OECD (2014) and report proportional 
changes in GDP between 2011 and 2030 imposed in the 
BAU simulation in Table 2. In the policy scenarios, to-
tal factor productivity parameters are set equal to values 
derived in the BAU simulation and GDP is endogenous.
Jacoby et al. (2017) estimate emissions from the combus-
tion of fossil fuels under a reference (no climate policies) 
case and a scenario when regions meet their Paris pledges. 
From these estimates, we calculate proportional reduc-
tions from the 2030 baseline projection of fossil fuel CO2 
emissions needed to meet the Paris pledges for each region 
in our model (Table 2). Estimated proportional emissions 
reductions due to the accord are largest in Canada, Austra-
lia–New Zealand, the US and the EU & EFTA.2
We impose emissions reductions in the model using an 
endogenous price for CO2 emissions. Each representative 
household is endowed with emission permits and firms 
are required to purchase one emission permit for each 
ton of CO2 emitted. The quantity of permits endowed 
to the representative household in region r is equal to 
, where  is total CO2 
emissions from the combustion of fossil fuels in the 
2030 BAU equilibrium, and  is proportional 
reduction in emissions consistent with the Paris Agree-
ment shown in Table 2. This approach in analogous to 
implementing a cap-and-trade program in each region 
with trading of emission permits across sectors, but 
without international trading of emissions permits.
We explore the impact of BCAs under the Paris Agree-
ment in three policy scenarios, and a further policy sce-
nario (using the aggregated version of the model) is con-
sidered to evaluate the outcome of a tariff war. To facilitate 
welfare analysis without calculating climate damages, 
global CO2 emissions are constant at the level consis-
2  The Paris pledge for some countries specifies a reduction in emis-
sions relative to an historic year (e.g., the EU has pledged to reduce 
its emissions by at least 40% below the 1990 level by 2030). In the 
modeling exercises, the 2030 baseline is known with certainty, so the 
reduction in emissions relative to the baseline can calculated to match 
the emissions reduction relative to a historic year. 
Table 2. Baseline GDP projections and 2030 reductions in CO2 emissions from fossil fuels and industry needed to comply with the 
Paris pledges.
Region Change in GDP, 2011 to 2030 Reduction in CO2 emissions, 2030a
USA 62.4% -34.3%
Australia-New Zealand 82.3% -46.4%
Canada 48.1% -54.0%
China 163.7% -1.1%
EU & EFTA 41.9% -30.9%
Japan 23.9% -11.7%
Mexico 73.3% -26.0%
South Korea 73.9% -39.6%
Rest of World 124.3% -5.1%
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tent with implementation of Paris pledges by all regions. 
In scenarios where the US does not restrict emissions, 
this is achieved by multiplying the endowment of CO2 
permits in non-US regions by a scaler ( ), so that glob-
al emissions equal the level when all regions meet their 
Paris pledges. That is, the endowment of CO2 permits is 
region r is given by As US 
emissions are endogenous when it does not meet its Paris 
pledges,  is determined endogenously in each scenario.
Policy scenarios considered in the analysis are sum-
marized in Table 3. In the first scenario, Lone-Wolf, all 
regions except the US reduce their CO2 emissions (and 
there are no BCAs). In the second scenario, BCA, all re-
gions except the US restrict emissions and tariffs, based 
on embodied CO2, are imposed on US exports of all sec-
tors except services. The third scenario, Paris, simulates 
emissions reductions pledged in NDCs under the Paris 
Climate Agreement in all regions (including the US). 
For computational reasons, our final policy scenario, 
Tariff-War, is only implemented in the two-region, sev-
en-sector aggregation of the model described in Section 
2.1. In this scenario, the US does not restrict emissions, 
the Coalition restricts emissions to meet the global Paris 
pledge, and the two regions impose welfare maximizing 
tariffs on each other’s exports of Other industry. This 
simulation is implemented by solving the model for, in 
one-percentage point increments, US and tariffs on Oth-
er industry imports between 0% and 35%, Coalition tar-
iffs on Other industry imports between 0% and 35%, and 
all combinations of those tariffs.
2.3 Border Carbon Adjustments & Embodied 
CO2 Emissions
In the BCA scenario, tariffs are used to retrospectively 
apply the carbon price in each importing region on emis-
sions embodied in goods sourced from the US. The ad 
valorem tariff imposed on imports of good i from the US 
by region r ( ) is given by:   (1)
where  is the price of a permit to release one ton 
of CO2 in region r, denotes tons of CO2 emissions 
embodied in each unit of good i, and  is the unit price 
of good i exported from the US.
Following Rutherford and Babiker (1997), our embod-
ied emissions calculations include those from direct and 
indirect sources. Direct emissions are those that result 
from the combustion of fossil fuels in the sector in ques-
tion, and indirect emissions are associated with interme-
diate inputs.  is calculated as:  (2)
where  is direct emissions from the burning of fos-
sil fuel f (coal, oil, gas) by industry i,  is the quan-
tity of intermediate input j used by industry i per unit 
of output, and  is the share of intermediate input j 
sourced domestically, all in the US. We multiply  by 
 to prevent emissions embodied in imported inter-
mediates from being charged twice—once when they are 
produced abroad and once when they are (incorporated 
in other goods) exported by the US. Applying equation 
(2) to each sector gives rise to a system of i equation and 
i unknowns. We assign values for ,  and  
using the GTAP database and solve the system of equa-
tion simultaneously to determine the value for each . 
3. Results
3.1 Sectoral Emissions Intensities & US Exports
For each sector (except energy production sectors), 
Figure 2a illustrates the emissions intensity of produc-
tion in the US and separately identifies direct emissions, 
emissions from electricity use, and emissions associated 
with other intermediate inputs. The four energy intensive 
sectors have the highest emissions intensities and elec-
tricity is a large source of indirect emissions, especially 
for Non-metallic minerals. The emissions intensity of 
production across regions is compared in Figure 2b. In 
general, emissions intensities are highest in developing 
countries, especially China, and US emissions intensities 
are high relative to those in other developed countries.
US exports by destination and sector (excluding energy 
production sectors) are reported in Figure 3. Excluding 
the Rest of the World, the EU (25.9%), Canada (11.7%), 
China (10.4%) and Mexico (8.6%) account for the largest 
share of US exports. The data also reveal that Non-metal-
lic minerals (0.7%), Iron and steel (1.5%), and Non-fer-
Table 3. Scenarios.  
Name Description
Lone-Wolf Emissions reductions in all regions except the US
BCA Emissions reductions in all regions except the US and BCAs imposed on exports from the US
Paris Implementation of NDCs by all regions
Tariff-War* Emissions reductions in the Coalition and welfare maximizing tariffs imposed by the Coalition and the US
* The Tariff-War scenario is only implemented in the two-region, seven-sector aggregation of the model.
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rous metals (2.6%)—the three most emissions intensive 
goods—account for relative small proportions of total 
US exports. On the other hand, Chemical, rubber & 
plastic products, which is relatively emissions intensive, 
accounts for a significant share (14.8%) of US exports. 
3.2 Paris Pledges & Border Carbon Adjustments
Results from our modeling exercises are displayed in 
Table 4 (CO2 prices, welfare and US emissions) and 
Figure 4 (US exports). In the Lone-Wolf scenario, CO2 
prices, in 2011 dollars per metric ton (t) of CO2, are high-
est in Canada ($252/tCO2), the EU & EFTA ($181/tCO2), 
Australia-New Zealand ($151/tCO2) and South Korea 
($144/tCO2). Conversely, carbon prices are relatively low 
in China ($5/tCO2) and Rest of World ($15/tCO2).
Proportional welfare changes reported in Table 4 are an-
nual equivalent variation changes in consumer income 
relative to GDP (and do not account for benefits from 
avoided climate damages). Decreases in welfare are larg-
est in Canada (3.1%), Australia–New Zealand (2.9%), 
Figure 2. CO2 emissions intensity of production by sector.
Figure 3. uS exports by sector and destination.
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Mexico (2.3%) and the EU & EFTA (2.2%). Despite a low 
carbon price, Rest of World also experiences a relatively 
large welfare decrease (1.5%) as it includes countries that 
are major crude oil exporters. Welfare decreases in Ja-
pan (0.1%) and Korea (0.9%) are moderate as mitigation 
costs for these fossil fuel importers are partially offset by 
decreases in fossil fuel prices.
US welfare increases by 0.21% relative to BAU in the 
Lone-Wolf scenario due to a fall in fossil fuel prices and 
improved competitiveness in export markets. As illustrat-
ed in Figure 4a, exports of Chemicals, rubber and plastic 
products experience the largest absolute increase in ex-
ports, but the proportional change in these exports (2.6%) 
is less than that for Non-metallic minerals (9.4%), and Iron 
and steel (9.6%). The largest changes in exports involve US 
goods shipped to the EU. US emissions increase by 1.9% 
relative to BAU due to decreased global fossil fuel prices 
and increased energy-intensive production, indicating 
leakage of emissions. Proportional emissions reductions 
in other regions are larger than those under each region’s 
Paris commitment, as these regions pursue deeper emis-
sions reductions to hold global emissions constant. 
In the BCA scenario, the largest carbon tariff is 12.8% 
(Table 5) and applies to US Non-metallic minerals (the 
most CO2-intensive sector) exported to Canada (the re-
gion with the highest carbon price). Carbon tariffs on 
US energy-intensive goods exported to the EU range 
from 4.4% to 9.3%, and tariffs imposed by China and 
Rest of World are less than 1%. Carbon tariffs increase 
the CO2 prices in most regions as they increase the cost 
of abating emissions by importing goods from the US. 
Despite the CO2 price increases, welfare in all non-US re-
Table 4. CO2 prices, welfare and emissions.
Lone-Wolf BCA Paris
CO
2
 prices, 2011$/t
USA - - 67.1
Australia & New Zealand 151.2 152.1 125.5
Canada 252.3 251.4 212.5
China 4.7 4.7 1.3
EU & EFTA 181.5 182.3 138.4
Japan 60.7 61.0 37.1
Mexico 67.7 67.5 50.7
South Korea 144.0 144.7 115.7
Rest of World 15.3 15.3 7.5
Welfare change relative to BAU, equivalent variation as percent of GDP
USA 0.21 0.05 -0.57
Australia & New Zealand -2.90 -2.85 -2.38
Canada -3.10 -2.91 -2.91
China -0.08 -0.07 0.08
EU & EFTA -2.20 -2.13 -1.62
Japan -0.09 -0.06 0.06
Mexico -2.29 -2.15 -2.10
South Korea -0.95 -0.90 -0.60
Rest of World -1.54 -1.52 -1.27
Change in CO
2
 emission relative to BAU, % 
USA 1.9 1.5 -34.3
Australia & New Zealand -49.9 -49.9 -46.4
Canada -57.0 -57.0 -54.0
China -7.6 -7.5 -1.1
EU & EFTA -35.4 -35.4 -30.9
Japan -17.5 -17.4 -11.7
Mexico -30.8 -30.8 -26.0
South Korea -43.6 -43.5 -39.6
Rest of World -11.3 -11.2 -5.1
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Figure 4. Absolute (right axis, bars) and proportion (left axis, dots) in the value of uS exports relative to BAu.
Table 5. Ad valorem tariffs on uS exports in the BCA scenario, %.
anz can chn eur jpn mex kor row
Agriculture 3.11 5.15 0.10 3.73 1.25 1.38 2.96 0.31
Chemical, rubber & plastics 3.66 6.06 0.11 4.39 1.47 1.63 3.49 0.37
Non-metallic minerals 7.76 12.84 0.24 9.31 3.11 3.45 7.39 0.78
Iron and Steel 5.89 9.74 0.18 7.06 2.36 2.61 5.61 0.59
Non-ferrous metals 4.74 7.84 0.15 5.68 1.90 2.10 4.51 0.48
Fabricated metals products 1.71 2.82 0.05 2.05 0.68 0.76 1.62 0.17
Food processing 2.55 4.22 0.08 3.06 1.02 1.13 2.43 0.26
Textiles, clothing & footwear 1.17 1.93 0.04 1.40 0.47 0.52 1.11 0.12
Transportation equipment 1.01 1.67 0.03 1.21 0.41 0.45 0.96 0.10
Electronic equipment 1.26 2.08 0.04 1.51 0.51 0.56 1.20 0.13
Other machinery & equip. 1.12 1.85 0.03 1.34 0.45 0.50 1.07 0.11
Other manufacturing 2.64 4.37 0.08 3.17 1.06 1.17 2.51 0.27
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gions increases relative to the Lone-Wolf scenario due to 
terms-of-trade improvements at the expense of the US. 
Welfare decreases in the US, but there is still a small wel-
fare increase relative to BAU. US exports, relative to BAU, 
decrease for most commodities, and are proportionally 
the largest for Non-ferrous metals (12.5%), Non-metallic 
minerals (9.5%), and Chemical rubber & plastic prod-
ucts (5.4%) (Figure 4b). These changes are driven by de-
creased exports to Canada and the EU with exports to 
China and Rest of World, which impose relative low car-
bon tariffs, increasing. US exports of services, which are 
not subject to a BCA, increase to all regions. The carbon 
tariffs result in a small reduction in US emissions and US 
emissions still increase to relative to BAU.
In the Paris scenario, a US carbon price of $67/tCO2 is 
required to meet its NDC emissions reduction target. 
US exports for all commodities decrease with the larg-
est proportional reductions occurring for the four en-
ergy-intensive industries (Figure 4c). Welfare in the US 
falls by 0.57% relative to BAU. As US welfare in this sce-
nario is significantly higher than in the BCA case, this 
indicates that BCAs would not be sufficient to make it 
economically advantageous for the US to implement pol-
icies to meet its Paris pledges. 
Due to emissions reductions in the US, carbon prices 
decrease elsewhere relative to the Lone-Wolf scenario, as 
less mitigation is required to meet the global constraint 
on CO2 emissions. Consequently, welfare is higher in 
each non-US region in the Paris scenario than in the 
Lone-Wolf scenario. Welfare increases due to the con-
straint on US emissions are smallest for the regions that 
trade intensively with the US (Canada and Mexico) as US 
exports become more expensive and the decrease in US 
income reduces demand for their exports.
3.3 A Tariff War
Welfare changes and CO2 prices from simulating our sce-
narios (including the Tariff-War case) when the model 
represents two regions and six sectors are displayed in 
Table 6. Estimated welfare changes in the US from the 
more aggregated version of the model in the first three 
scenarios are qualitatively similar to those in Table 4: (1) 
The US experiences a small welfare gain when it does not 
restrict emissions and other nations do, (2) BCAs result 
in a small reduction in US welfare, and (3) meeting its 
Paris pledge results in a moderate reduction in US wel-
fare. In the BCA scenario, the Coalition imposes a 0.28% 
tariff on Other industry goods produced in the US.
The Nash equilibrium in the Tariff-War scenario occurs 
when the US imposes a tariff of 19% on Other industry 
imports and the Coalition imposes a 23% tariff on these 
goods. The tariff war results in a decrease in US welfare 
that is more than double that in the Paris scenario, indi-
cating that when faced with the threat of a tariff war the 
best play for the US is to meet its Paris pledge (and avoid 
a tariff war). In the Coalition, welfare is higher when 
there are BCAs than in the Tariff-War scenario, indicat-
ing that, in simple one-shot game, the Coalition also has 
an incentive to avoid a tariff war and the BCA scenario 
represents the Nash equilibrium. 
Focusing on the simple one-shot Nash equilibrium, how-
ever, ignores other important considerations. First, the 
Coalition may derive utility by enforcing ‘fairness’, and this 
utility gain not considered in our simulations may offset 
the welfare decrease simulated in the Tariff-War scenar-
io relative to the BCA scenario. Second, the experimental 
economics literature has shown that agents that coop-
erate are willing to punish free-riding, even if it is costly 
for them (Fehr and Gächter, 2000). Additionally, the US, 
under the Trump administration, has indicated that it is 
willing to use trade measures to increase domestic welfare. 
If the US pursues such policies, the optimal strategy for the 
coalition is to impose a welfare maximizing tariff.
To illuminate possible outcomes, Figure 5 reports welfare 
changes in the two regions for alternative values of the Co-
alition tariff when the US imposes a welfare maximizing 
tariff (conditional on the coalition tariff) and the Coali-
tion reduces emission to meet the global Paris pledge. The 
optimal US tariff is 18% for values of the Coalition tariff 
Table 6. CO2 prices and welfare from the two-region, six sector model.
Lone-Wolf BCA Paris Tariff-War
CO2 prices, 2011$/t
USA - - $66.2 -
Coalition $18.5 $18.5 $10.1 $18.7
Welfare change relative to BAU, equivalent variation as percent of GDP
USA 0.02 -0.02 -0.72 -1.50
Coalition -0.40 -0.39 -0.21 -0.57
Change in CO2 emission relative to BAU, % 
USA 1.3 1.3 -34.3 -0.8
Coalition -15.9 -15.9 -9.3 -15.5
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less than or equal to 18%, 19% for Coalition tariff values 
between 14% and 24%, 20% for Coalition tariffs between 
25% and 34%, and 21% when the Coalition tariff is 35%. 
US welfare is a decreasing function of the tariff imposed 
by the Coalition and US welfare falls by 2.2% relative to 
BAU when the Coalition imposes a 35% tariff. The change 
in Coalition welfare is negative for all Coalition tariffs 
because this region reduces emissions and faces optimal 
US tariffs. At low tariffs, an increase in the Coalition tariff 
leads to relative large increases in welfare in this region. 
Coalition welfare is maximized when it imposes a 23% 
tariff and increases in the tariff beyond this value lead to 
relative small reductions in coalition welfare.
Figure 5 reveals two key outcomes. First, proportional 
US welfare losses from a tariff are much larger than those 
in the Coalition. Second, by imposing a tariff higher than 
the welfare maximizing one, the Coalition can inflict rel-
atively large welfare decreases on the US while incurring 
small welfare decreases. A uniform response from the 
Coalition would, however, require a high level of coor-
dination and possibly also income transfers among these 
regions. Nevertheless, our results indicate that there is 
scope for the Coalition to use tariffs as a mechanism to 
enforce the US to implement climate policies.
4. Conclusions
Avoiding undesirable human-induced climate change 
will require multilateral cooperation between nations. 
The Paris Agreement attempts to achieve this goal but 
meeting planned emissions reduction will rely on coun-
ties voluntarily agreeing to stay in the accord. The ab-
sence of legal channels to enforce this agreement means 
that other measures will be required to persuade nations 
to achieve emission reduction targets. BCAs are one such 
mechanism and this paper quantitatively evaluated the 
impact of these tariffs using an economy-wide model 
with energy sector detail. As there are several indications 
that the current US Administration may withdraw the 
US from the Agreement or fail to meet its commitments, 
we considered a case where all countries except the US 
enact policies to reduce emissions and trade measures—
BCAs and welfare-maximizing tariffs—are imposed on 
US exports. 
In our analysis, BCAs imposed by each region were a 
function of the carbon price in that region and emissions 
embodied in US exports. The required carbon tariffs 
were quite low (less than 5%) in most cases, and higher 
tariffs (up to 13%) only applied to a small share of US 
exports and could be avoided by re-routing exports to 
regions with lower BCAs. Consequently, BCAs had only 
a small negative impact on US emissions and welfare. As 
US welfare was significantly lower when it met its Par-
is pledge than when it faced BCAs but did not regulate 
GHG emissions, we conclude that BCAs will not be ef-
fective in enforcing climate commitments.
In contrast, welfare changes were relatively large in the 
Nash equilibrium of tariff war between the US and the Co-
alition (the rest of the world). US welfare under a tariff war 
was significantly lower than when it restricted emissions to 
meet its Paris pledge (and avoided the tariff war). While the 
final outcome will depend on the objective of the coalition 
and the behavior of the US, these results indicate that there 
is scope to use carefully chosen tariffs as an enforcement 
tool against regions that fail to meet their Paris pledges.
Figure 5. Welfare changes for alternative Coalition tariffs when the uS imposes optimal tariffs.
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